[国民经济学Seminar]Ordeal Mechanisms, Information and the Cost-effectiveness of Subsidies: Evidence from Subsidized Eyeglasses in Rural China
发文时间:2016-03-10

国民经济学Seminar

第12期

    国民经济学Seminar由中国人民大学国民经济管理系主办,其宗旨是从国民经济管理的视角,构建一个开放的学术交流平台,推动研究与教学工作。
   
   时间:2016年3月16日(周三)中午12:00—13:30
   地点:明德主楼734会议室
   主讲:Sean Sylvia
   主题:Ordeal Mechanisms, Information and the Cost-effectiveness of Subsidies: Evidence from Subsidized Eyeglasses in Rural China
   摘要:The cost-effectiveness of policies providing subsidized goods is often compromised by limited use of the goods provided. Through a randomized trial, we test two approaches to improve the cost-effectiveness of a program distributing free eyeglasses to myopic children in rural China. Requiring recipients to undergo an ordeal was able to target eyeglasses to those who used them without reducing usage relative to free delivery. An information campaign increased use when eyeglasses were freely delivered but not under an ordeal. Free delivery plus information was determined to be the most socially cost-effective approach and obtained the highest rate of eyeglass use. 
演讲者介绍: Sean Sylvia is an Assistant Professor in the School of Economics at Renmin University of China. He is also affiliated with the Rural Education Action Project (REAP) at Stanford University and the Center for Experimental Economics in Education (CEEE) at Shanxi Normal University. His research focuses on topics related to health and education in China’s rural areas and migrant communities and has appeared in journals such as the BMJ, Health Policy and Planning, Health Affairs, Economic Development and Cultural Change, and the Economics of Education Review. Sean earned his PhD from the University of Maryland in 2014. 
 
中国人民大学经济学院 2016年3月10日