[组织经济学Seminar]Political Connections and the Biased Quality Inspection System
发文时间:2014-05-05

[ECON20141105]


中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心

组织经济学Seminar



    组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
   
 时间:2014年5月7日(周三)12:00-13:30
 地点:明德主楼734会议室
   主讲:刘小鲁
   主题:Political Connections and the Biased Quality Inspection System: Evidences from Chinese National Surveillance Sampling
    摘要:This paper studies whether political connections distort the Chinese mandatory quality inspection system. The analysis shows that political connections significantly lower firms` probabilities of being inspected, but do not impact results of quality testing. The treatment effects of this distorted system are also analyzed. Compared with remaining uninspected, a firm`s market share increases significantly if it is inspected to be qualified, but varies insignificantly if it obtains a disqualified result. Based on the assumption that only low quality producers are eager to be protected, we explain this by the speculation that consumers, whenever forms beliefs of the sampling bias, lower their expectations on the average quality of the uninspected, leading to worsened adverse selection for these firms.
  
   演讲者简介:刘小鲁,中国人民大学经济学院副教授。研究领域包括产业组织理论和政府管制。2003年毕业于南京大学经济学院,2006年和2009年先后获得中国社会科学院经济学硕士和博士学位。目前在《经济研究》、《世界经济》和《管理世界》等期刊上发表多篇论文。
   


    中国人民大学经济学院    人大企业与组织研究中心    2014年5月4日