时  间：2024年11月15日10:30-12:00

地  点：立德楼702

主讲人：张军（南京审计大学经济学院教授）

主持人：赵玮（中国人民大学经济学院讲师）

主  题：Verifiable affirmative action in Chinese high school admissions

讲座简介：

We study the widely used quota allocation policy in Chinese high school admissions, where high-quality high schools exogenously allocate a proportion of their admission quotas to various middle schools, ensuring that students from low-performing middle schools have the opportunity to enter high-quality high schools. The tradition of accountability in China requires local governments to make the quota allocation process verifiable for students. Among the various mechanisms used by different cities, we acknowledge the advantage of sequential mechanisms in verifiability but identify their flaws in strategic complexity. We then propose a concept of verifiability for simultaneous mechanisms and prove that it essentially pins down two choice rules for high schools. It turns out that a mechanism is individually rational, strategy-proof, and verifiable if and only if it is the deferred acceptance mechanism associated with one of the two choice rules. We discuss the implications of our results for the practices in China.

主讲人简介：

张军，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院教授，致力于市场设计的理论及应用研究，近年在American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior，Economic Theory等国际期刊上发表多篇论文。