中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar 总第68期  【OE201515】

组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
时间：2015年12月24日（周四）12：00-13：30
地点：明主729
主讲：陈晓光（中国人民大学财金学院讲师、西澳大学商学院助理教授）
主题：Shifts of Distortion and Corruption over Local Political Cycles in China
摘要：Do corrupt firms create negative externality and hurt less corrupt ones? I answer this question by exploring cross-industry distribution of taxation, credit, and corruption over local political cycles in China. It is known that capital-intensive firms are more likely to be corrupt. The paper argues that preferential treatment in taxation or credit allocation towards corrupt firms must result in detrimental treatment against others when governments face resource constraints, and that corruption is generally conducted through political network that expands and shrinks over political cycles. Using the variation in turnover of secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party in 275 prefectures between 2000 and 2007, I find that, as the tenure of the secretaries increases, enforcement of both VAT and corporate income tax as well as access to credit all change in favour of capital-intensive industries but to the detriment of labour-intensive counterparts. I then use the firm-level Entertainment and Travel Cost (ETC) as a proxy of corruption and find that the variation of cross-industry distribution of ETC over secretaries’ tenure is in line with the variation in taxation and credit allocation. The finding suggests that corruption may not reduce overall distortions in the economy but only shifts distortions across economic agents.


演讲者简介：陈晓光，中国人民大学财金学院讲师、西澳大学商学院助理教授，主要研究领域为发展与增长、公共金融、中国经济，曾在《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》发表过多篇文章，曾荣获中国留美经济学会2005年“邹至庄最佳经济学论文奖”。


中国人民大学经济学院 人大企业与组织研究中心 人大微观数据与实证方法研究中心 2015年12月21日