[数量经济学研讨会]Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices
发文时间:2015-12-18
数量经济学研讨会 [201507]
报告时间:2015年12月22日下午12:30-13:30
报告地点:明德主楼729
内容简介: We study price formation in an economy where buyers with unit demand decide to purchase one of two possible goods which are traded in two distinct markets. The goods traded within each market are identical, common-value objects and we model the price formation process as a large uniform-price auction. Before the auctions, bidders receive informative but imperfect signals about the state of the world and choose to participate in one of the markets. Our main result shows that if market frictions lead to uncertain gains from trade in any of the two markets, then there is no equilibrium where prices aggregate information. In contrast, if both markets are frictionless, then prices fully aggregate information. The findings generalize to the case of arbitrary number of markets. Our results highlight how self-selection of bidders into the two markets leads to informational contagion between the markets which in turn hinders information aggregation in both markets.
报告人简介:Mehmet Ekmekci is an associate professor (with tenure) of Economics at Boston College. He obtained the PhD degree from Princeton University in 2006. His main research interests include microeconomic theory, game theory, political economy, and mechanism design, and he has published about 10 papers on top economic journals on AER, RES, and JET.
数量经济教研室 运筹学与数量经济研究所 中国人民大学经济学院 2015年12月
为了加强与国内外高水平数量经济学学者的交流和合作,更好地促进数量经济学与院内其他学科之间的合作交流,数量经济学教研室将举办数量经济学研讨会。研讨会侧重于理论计量经济学、应用计量经济学及数理经济学的最新研究成果,欢迎各位学者参加或报告。如果您有研究成果想要报告,请与数量经济学教研室章永辉博士(yonghui.zhang@hotmail.com)联系。
报告题目:Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices
报告人: Prof. Mehmet Ekmeci报告时间:2015年12月22日下午12:30-13:30
报告地点:明德主楼729
内容简介: We study price formation in an economy where buyers with unit demand decide to purchase one of two possible goods which are traded in two distinct markets. The goods traded within each market are identical, common-value objects and we model the price formation process as a large uniform-price auction. Before the auctions, bidders receive informative but imperfect signals about the state of the world and choose to participate in one of the markets. Our main result shows that if market frictions lead to uncertain gains from trade in any of the two markets, then there is no equilibrium where prices aggregate information. In contrast, if both markets are frictionless, then prices fully aggregate information. The findings generalize to the case of arbitrary number of markets. Our results highlight how self-selection of bidders into the two markets leads to informational contagion between the markets which in turn hinders information aggregation in both markets.
报告人简介:Mehmet Ekmekci is an associate professor (with tenure) of Economics at Boston College. He obtained the PhD degree from Princeton University in 2006. His main research interests include microeconomic theory, game theory, political economy, and mechanism design, and he has published about 10 papers on top economic journals on AER, RES, and JET.
数量经济教研室 运筹学与数量经济研究所 中国人民大学经济学院 2015年12月
为了加强与国内外高水平数量经济学学者的交流和合作,更好地促进数量经济学与院内其他学科之间的合作交流,数量经济学教研室将举办数量经济学研讨会。研讨会侧重于理论计量经济学、应用计量经济学及数理经济学的最新研究成果,欢迎各位学者参加或报告。如果您有研究成果想要报告,请与数量经济学教研室章永辉博士(yonghui.zhang@hotmail.com)联系。