[能源经济学研讨会]Is the Leading Role Desirable? - A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market
发文时间:2012-04-22

能源经济学研讨会

时间:52日,周三, 12:00-2:00   

地点:明德主楼734

题目:

Is the Leading Role Desirable? - A Simulation Analysis of the Stackelberg Behavior in World Petroleum Market

文章摘要:

This article explores extraction profiles in the Stackelberg equilibrium of exhaustible resource industry. Calibrated with real data of world petroleum market, the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash equilibriums are solved numerically. The properties of the Stackelberg equilibrium are compared and contrasted with the benchmark open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Simulation results indicate that the leader?s gains are limited in the Stackelberg strategic setting. Methodologically, this article pioneers solving the Stackelberg game numerically in a dynamic and empirical model. 

作者简介

Zili Yang, professor of Department of Economics, State University of New York at Binghamton. His research focuses on resource and environmental economics, energy economics, economic modeling, applied game theory, public economics and Chinese economy.

 

 中国人民大学 经济学院能源经济系