[劳动与发展经济学研讨会]When do legal and relational contracts function as substitutes or complements
发文时间:2013-03-18

劳动与发展经济学研讨会              

【ECON201302】      

   

     

时间:320日,星期, 14:00—16:00
地点:明德主楼729会议室                            

【主讲人】:李三希 中国人民大学经济学院        

【主题】:hen do legal and relational contracts function as substitutes or complements            

【摘要】:We study the conditions under which formal legal contracts complement or substitute for informal relational contracts when only part of the cooperation dimensions are legally contractible. We show that:1) With symmetric payoffs but interdependent dimensions, technological or preference complementarity (substitution) between the cooperation dimensions yields the complementarity (substitution) between legal and relational contracts; and 2)With asymmetric payoffs but independent dimensions, legal contracts complement informal relational contracts if the dimension for which players have more incentive to deviate is first legally-contracted.


参会人员:经济学院劳动与发展经济学相关领域青年教师,也欢迎感兴趣的老师和同学参与。论文结束后会就模型的进一步应用空间进行讨论。        

       

  欢迎相关领域老师同学参加!如有相关论文有意在研讨会上报告,也可以联系经济学院孙文凯老师(sunwk@ruc.edu.cn)。