题目：Screening Network Degrees: Optimal Network Interventions under Asymmetric Information

时间：2024年11月8日10:30-12:00

地点：立德楼702

汇报人：石凡奇（北京大学经济学院助理教授）

主持人：赵玮（中国人民大学经济学院讲师）

摘要：We propose a novel screening approach to study network interventions in product markets characterized by positive network externalities, where agents possess private information regarding their network degrees-specifically, susceptibility and influence. Under incentive-compatible constraints, we demonstrate that the principal can directly screen agents based on susceptibility, but can only indirectly infer their expected influence. Based on this simplification, we fully characterize the optimal intervention policies for both a profit-maximizing monopolist seller and a welfare-maximizing social planner. In the case of quadratic intrinsic value, we further derive insights into the optimal allocation, pricing patterns and profit/welfare gain from screening. Our analysis not only offers practical guidance for implementing network-based interventions in product markets with positive network externalities, but also sheds light on the value of network information.

个人简介：石凡奇，北京大学经济学院助理教授，博士毕业于斯坦福大学。研究侧重机制设计及其应用。论文发表于RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior等期刊，目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。