题目：Preference Evolution under Partner Choice

时间：2024年11月27日10:30-12:00

地点：明德主楼734

汇报人：王子伟（北京大学光华管理学院博雅博士后）

主持人：赵玮（中国人民大学经济学院讲师）

摘要：We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short-run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in social interactions, impacting material payoffs. These payoffs, in turn, affect how preferences evolve in the long-run. To properly model the "match-to-interact" process, we combine stable matching and equilibrium concepts. Our analysis unveils that endogenous matching gives rise to a class of preferences that exhibit both homophily and efficiency. Such preferences stand out in the evolutionary process because they are able to force positive assortative matching and efficient play. Under incomplete information, a strong form of homophily, parochialism, is necessary for a preference to prevail in evolution, because stronger incentives are required to engage in self-sorting with information friction.

个人简介：王子伟，北京大学光华管理学院博雅博士后，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校经济学博士。主要研究领域为博弈论，匹配理论和信息经济学。研究成果发表于经济学国际期刊Social Choice and Welfare，并且有多篇论文处于返修阶段。担任Games and Economic Behavior，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Economic Theory等期刊的匿名审稿人，现主持国家自然科学基金青年项目一项。