[组织经济学Seminar]Optimal Financial Contracting in Strategic Alliances
发文时间:2013-12-12

中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心

组织经济学Seminar

【OE201317】

组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn

时间:2013年12月18日(周三)12:00-13:30

地点:明德主楼0404教室

主讲洪洁瑛

主题Optimal Financial Contracting in Strategic Alliances

摘要

This paper uses an optimal contracting approach to analyze the development of an innovative product through strategic alliance by an entrepreneur and an incumbent. The entrepreneur has limited endowment and the development of the innovation affects the profit of the incumbent because of externalities. When the externalities are positive, an increase in the entrepreneur’s endowment increases the outside option of the incumbent. This tightens the participation constraint of the incumbent, which reduces and can sometimes even offset the positive effect in relaxing financial constraints of an increase in endowment. In addition, we also find that the incentive compatible financial claims of alliances include debt, equity, convertible debt, and preferred equity, which are consistent with empirical observations.

演讲者简介:洪洁瑛,现为法国ESSEC商学院(ESSEC Business School)助理教授。她先后毕业于中国人民大学、北京大学和法国图卢兹大学,并获得图卢兹大学金融学博士学位。她的主要研究领域是公司金融、契约理论和组织经济学。

项目协调人:聂辉华

中国人民大学经济学院

人大企业与组织研究中心

2013年12月12日