中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar  
总第70期 【OE201602】  
组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。
 
时间：2016年3月24日（周四）12：00－13：30
地点：明德主楼734会议室
主讲：李志赟
主题：Competition in Procurement Auctions with Corruption（政府采购中的拍卖竞争与腐败）
摘要：We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procurement auction. A bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of a government. He invites firms into the auction at positive costs, and may request a bribe from the winning firm afterward. We first show that, under standard assumptions, in the absence of corruption, the bureaucrat invites more firms than social optimum number that maximizes social welfare. Secondly, the effects of corruption on competition and social welfare vary across different forms of bribery. In the case of fixed bribe, corruption has no effect on equilibrium competition, yet does induce social welfare loss due to the distortion cost of increased public spending. In the case of proportional bribe, the corrupt bureaucrat will invite fewer firms into the auction, which may result in Pareto-improving allocation in equilibrium. Finally, we also show that information disclosure may consistently induce more firms to be invited, if compared with the case of no information disclosure, no matter there is corruption or not.
 
演讲者简介：李志赟，英国杜伦商学院讲师，英国高等教育学会研究员，主要研究方向为激励理论、产业组织理论、发展经济学、中国经济学，曾在Economics Bulletin, Economics Letters, Journal of Comparative Economics,《经济研究》、《经济学季刊》等国内外杂志发表过多篇文章。
 
 
中国人民大学经济学院 人大企业与组织研究中心 国发院新政治经济学研究中心 人大微观数据与实证方法研究中心 2016年3月20日