中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar

总第55期 【OE201502】

组织经济学（Organizational Economics）Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心（CFOS）主办。CFOS的宗旨是，利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题，推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS，请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


时间：2015年5月13日（周三）12：00－13：30
地点：明德主楼734会议室
主持人：谢伦裕 博士
主讲：谢阳
主题：Machiavellian Experimentation
摘要：Motivated by the choice of strategy during decisive moments in history, we analyze a common situation of collective decision making in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs in which any decision other than the default option requires unanimity. We note that, when heterogeneous beliefs exist, decision makers could be rewarded or punished for being proven correct or incorrect by experimentation. We show that, when decision makers care strongly about potential rewards and punishments, they will agree to experimentation if, and only if, they have diametrically opposite beliefs, but not if they hold moderate beliefs. We illustrate our model with two examples: the disagreement within the leadership of the Allied Forces on the Western Front of World War II in the autumn of 1944 and the decision making process of the Chinese leadership during the country`s transition starting in the late 1970s.


演讲者简介：谢阳，美国加州大学伯克利分校在读博士。他的主要研究领域为比较经济学、商品市场、产业组织。他已在Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of the International Economic Association和Computational Economics上发表论文，并担任Journal of Comparative Economics和Water Economics and Policy杂志的审稿人。




中国人民大学经济学院 人大企业与组织研究中心 2015年5月11日