【摘要】：This paper investigates whether social image concern affects the level of indirect reciprocity in one-shot interaction. Indirect reciprocity refers to the case that a donor helps a recipient, but the recipient can only reciprocate to an anonymous

beneficiary. We design a laboratory experiment of the above game, but vary whether the donor can observe the recipient’s repayment amount to the beneficiary. We find that the observable repayment condition significantly increases the recipient’s transfer. The increase is largely attributed to the more significant effect of the donor sending a message requesting favorable treatment, and slightly due to social connection between the donor and the beneficiary outside of the laboratory. These results show the importance of social image concern and the specific channels it functions through.

主讲人介绍：梁平汉博士2010年毕业于西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学获得经济学博士学位，主要研究领域为博弈论、政治经济学、实验经济学、组织经济学、发展经济学。已经在中英文核心刊物发表若干学术论文，并担任多家英文学术刊物审稿人。

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中国人民大学经济学院