[宏观经济学研讨会]Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy
发文时间:2014-12-08
[ECON20141222]
宏观经济学研讨会 (总第173期)

【时间】2014年12月10日(周三)12:15-13:45
【地点】明商0302教室
【主讲】林炜  中国人民大学经济学院
【点评】刘凯  中国人民大学经济学院助理教授、英国剑桥大学经济学博士
【主题】 Optimal Time-Consistent Macroprudential Policy (written by Javier Bianchi and Enrique G. Mendoza, NBER Working Paper,2013)
【摘要】Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality, because agents do not internalize how collateral prices respond to collective borrowing decisions, particularly when binding collateral constraints trigger a crisis. We show that agents in a competitive equilibrium borrow "too much" during credit expansions compared with a financial regulator who internalizes this externality. Under commitment, however, this regulator faces a time inconsistency problem: It promises low future consumption to prop up current asset prices when collateral constraints bind, but this is not optimal ex post. Instead, we study the optimal, time-consistent policy of a regulator who cannot commit to future policies. Quantitative analysis shows that this policy reduces the incidence and magnitude of crises, removes fat tails from the distribution of returns and reduces risk premia.
【主持】陈彦斌 教授


人大宏观经济学研讨会(Macro Workshop)旨在追踪宏观经济学国际最新进展,倡导构建符合国情的动态优化模型,并使用计算机模拟研究经济增长、收入分配和宏观政策等中国宏观经济重大问题。


联系人:郭豫媚    Email:Macro_Workshop@163.com
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经济学院 中国经济改革与发展研究院