国民经济学seminar

    中国人民大学经济学院国民经济学seminar将于2017年4月27日中午12点在明德主楼623召开。届时山东大学Roland Cheo教授和李菁萍助理教授将对实验经济学和行为经济学研究成果做学术报告。

报告人简介：

    Roland Cheo，山东大学经济研究院教授，澳大利亚莫纳什大学（Monash University）经济学博士，曾任新加坡国立大学经济学系研究员。主要从事实验经济学、行为经济学和博弈论研究，先后在Economic Letters、International Review of Economics等期刊上发表数篇论文。

   李菁萍，山东大学经济研究院讲师，新加坡国立大学经济学博士。主要从事实验经济学、行为经济学研究，关注慈善捐赠、性别差异和利他性行为，研究论文在Economic Inquiry等国际期刊上发表。

报告内容简介：

Roland Cheo教授的报告主题为：Contributing Time and Effort in Public or Minding My Business in Private? Answers from a Real Effort Public Goods Task:                  This paper therefore provides a new experimental design which de-emphasizes monetary contributions into the public account, while retaining the essential features of the public goods game. Instead of the stylised task of the public goods game, we base our experiment on one real effort cognitive task: solving a jigsaw puzzle, in order to see how contributions vary according to the level of cognitive effort needed to render help to strangers.              Our main results show that contributions hurt performance in the private account, while helping others complete the tasks faster.This gives evidence that people are willing to help others to their own detriment. This observation cannot be gleaned from the standard public goods game alone because the private account in the standard public goods game is a guaranteed amount, and contributions may be motivated as an act of charity above and beyond this minimum amount. As task complexity increases, this helping behavior in the real task persists and even strengthens.

李菁萍助理教授的报告主题为：Do unto others as others do unto me?: voice matters：

    Do we penalise an innocent outsider when we have been unfairly dealt with? On the other hand, do we reward outsiders when we have been treated well? In this paper, we investigate the effect of voice on the decisions of recipients who become dictators in a two-stage three-person dictator game. In the first stage, the randomly assigned dicator shares a pie with a randomly assigned recipient. This recipient then plays the role of ‘sender` in the second stage dictator game with an outsider. We find that these recipients-turned-dictators` transfers are not significantly different from the dictators in the first stage, though they are highly correlated. When recipient in the first stage, after receiving their transfers are allowed to leave a private message to their dictators, when it is their turn to become dictators, the amount they transfer increases significantly. Further evidence shows that having voice mainly impacts the future decisions of recipients who received a low amount in the first stage. Voice also reduces the level of correlation between first stage dictator`s and the second stage recipient-turned-dictators` transfers.

报告将采取PPT展示和演讲等形式，欢迎积极参加。

         
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