[宏观经济学研讨会]When does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support
发文时间:2017-04-13

     【ECON20171205】  
      宏观经济学研讨会          (总第220期)      
【时间】2016年4月19日(周三)12:15-13:45  
【地点】明商0302教室  
【主讲】黄源 中国人民大学经济学院  
【主题】When does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support (M. Negro & C. Sims, Working Paper, 2015)  
【摘要】Using a simple, general equilibrium model, we argue that a central bank with a large balance sheet composed of long-duration nominal assets should have access to, and be willing to ask for, support for its balance sheet by the fiscal authority. Otherwise its ability to control inflation may be at risk. This need for balance sheet support — a within government transaction — is distinct from the need for fiscal backing of inflation policy that arises even in models where the central bank’s balance sheet is merged with that of the rest of the government.  
【点评】薛涧坡 中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授  
【主持】陈彦斌 教授  
 
 
    人大宏观经济学研讨会(Macro Workshop)旨在追踪宏观经济学国际最新进展,倡导构建符合国情的动态优化模型,并使用计算机模拟研究经济增长、收入分配和宏观政策等中国宏观经济重大问题。  
联系人:刘哲希    Email:Macro_Workshop@163.com  
资料下载:www.docin.com/mydoc-88265459-1.html  
更多讲座信息请访问:econ.ruc.edu.cn,www.yanjiuyuan.com.cn  
   
   
      经济学院          中国经济改革与发展研究院