Goalsetting, effort provision and performance: A field experiment
发文时间:2019-06-04

行为和实验经济学研讨会          (总第6期)     

【时  间】2019年6月12日(周三)12:00—13:30   

【地  点】明德主楼729会议室       

【主  题】Goalsetting, effort provision and performance: A field experiment      

【主讲人】翁茜,中国人民大学劳动人事学院      

【主持人】孙文凯,中国人民大学经济学院       

【点评人】王湘红,中国人民大学经济学院          

【讲座摘要】Goal setting may be a low-cost, scalable and logistically simple commitment device to help people self-regulate their behavior, and increase their effort and consequently improve their performance. By conducting a field experiment in college physical training course, we investigate the effects of goal setting and goal design features on effort provision in training and tests and on their performance. We exogenously vary whether or not a goal is set and whether or not the goal is set based on accurately knowing one’s ability. We find that when students know their precise ability, goal setting significantly raises test performance. Goal setting also significantly raises test effort, especially when students do not know their precise ability.          

【主讲人简介】翁茜,瑞典哥德堡大学经济学博士,中国人民大学劳动人事学院讲师,主要研究领域为激励机制和企业绩效。近年来,已在Journal of Public Economics、China Economic Review等期刊上发表多篇论文。