[组织经济学Seminar]Optimal Punishment in Contests with Endogenous Entry
发文时间:2012-04-13

中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心

组织经济学Seminar

【SE2012S04】

时间:2012年4月18日(周三)12:00-13:30

地点:明德主楼734会议室

主讲:王哲伟

主题Optimal Punishment in Contests with Endogenous Entry

摘要:

We study optimal punishments in an effort-maximizing all-pay contest with a fixed prize and endogenous entry. When a small punishment is introduced, the lowest ability players drop out and those of medium ability make less effort, while only the highest ability players make more effort. A sufficient condition is given for the optimal punishment to be zero if the contest designer wishes to maximize expected total effort. However, when the objective is to maximize the expected highest individual effort, a positive punishment is desirable under much weaker conditions, and in particular if there are a sufficient number of players.

演讲者简介:王哲伟,现为山东大学经济学院讲师。他于英国爱丁堡大学获得经济学硕士和博士学位,研究领域为竞赛与冲突理论、博弈论和拍卖理论等,曾在B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics等杂志上发表论文。

组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn

项目协调人:聂辉华,niehuihua(at)gmail.com

中国人民大学经济学院

人大企业与组织研究中心

2012年4月13日