组织经济学seminar138期
发文时间:2024-04-24

题目:The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts

时间:2024年4月23日10:30-12:00

地点:明德主楼729

汇报人邢亦青(斯坦福大学经济学博士;北京大学国家发展研究院长聘副教授)

主持人:赵玮(中国人民大学经济学院讲师)


摘要

We argue that firm-level agency conflicts not only counter the role of network structure in the propagation of shocks but they can have a significant impact on system-wide behavior that differs from those predicted based on network structure alone. This implies that corporate governance can play an important role in macro fluctuations.

We consider a collection of firms linked through equity cross-holdings whose managers can make investment decisions in response to an exogenous shock. Prior work concludes that more integrated networks amplify shocks. We find that if managers are subject to default costs or limited liability, this effect is reversed because their investment decisions mitigate the spread of an initial shock. In the face of moral hazard, however, their investment choices amplify an initial shock. In particular, when the network is fully diversified, the aggregate effect of idiosyncratic shocks does not diminish as received wisdom would suggest.


个人简介

邢亦青,北京大学国家发展研究院长聘副教授、研究员、博导。斯坦福大学经济学博士,师从马修-杰克逊教授;曾任职于美国约翰霍普金斯大学。研究兴趣主要为:社会与经济网络、微观经济理论、市场和机制设计、发展经济学等;十余篇论文发表在PNAS,Journal of the European Economic Association,RAND,Theoretical Economics,European Economic Review和《经济研究》、《经济学(季刊)》等国内外顶尖学术期刊。曾受邀在剑桥、耶鲁、普林斯顿、芝加哥、NBER等顶尖院校、机构和会议进行学术报告;担任Nature、PNAS、AER、QJE、MS、JASA等四十余本国际期刊的匿名审稿人。现开设《社会与经济网络》等课程。