近日，我院汪紫珈老师合作论文“Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search”在国际顶尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory正式发表。

1.内容摘要

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower price with second-stage delivery. Thus the optimal form of search deterrence depends on the observability of the buyer's outside option.

2.作者简介

汪紫珈，2014年6月毕业于武汉大学数理经济与数理金融专业，2020年获得新加坡国立大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为应用微观理论，主攻机制设计、竞争理论和拍卖理论方面的研究。2020年9月汪紫珈加入中国人民大学经济学院企业经济学与网络经济学教研室。