[组织经济学Seminar]Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China
发文时间:2016-06-14
中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Seminar 总第76期 【OE201608】       组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。 时间:2016年6月15日(周三)12:00-13:30 地点:人大明德主楼729会议室 主讲:张牧扬(上海财经大学中国公共财政研究院讲师) 主题:Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China(庇护网络、政绩激励和中国经济发展) 摘要:Subnational officials are central actors in China’s rapid economic takeoff, yet it remains unclear what motivated them to undertake costly developmental effort. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that emphasizes the performance incentives generated by the formal selection system, we argue that the formal link between performance and reward is far from institutionalized and that informal patron-client relations play a crucial role in sustaining the performance contract between agents and their superiors. We test implications of this informal exchange using an original city-level panel dataset and a new method for identifying political connections between local elites. We find that cities with leaders connected to the incumbent provincial secretary achieve significantly faster growth than those without and that the growth differential is primarily driven by enhanced incentives from the clients.We also show that agents’ performance is disproportionately highly rewarded when it is delivered under their patron’s supervision. 演讲者简介:张牧扬,北京大学国家发展研究院中国经济研究中心博士,现任上海财经大学中国公共财政研究院讲师。研究领域包括地方政府与官员治理、地方财政收支与转移支付、土地与房地产市场。在《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《财政研究》、《世界经济文汇》等国内一流期刊及Journal of Economic Growth等国际一流或知名经济学期刊发表论文多篇。是Journal of Economic Growth、《经济研究》、《世界经济》、《经济学》(季刊)、《世界经济文汇》匿名审稿人。  
中国人民大学经济学院 人大企业与组织研究中心 人大国发院新政治经济学研究中心 2016年6月12日

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