【时间】2019年11月26日（周二）12:00-13:30

【地点】中国人民大学明德主楼614B

【主讲人】徐晓书，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授

【主题】The Economics of Political Connection: Local Bureaucrats' Career

Concern versus the Corrupt Incentive

【主持人】李三希，中国人民大学经济学院教授

【主讲人介绍】徐晓书，现为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授，研究领域为微观经济理论、产业组织、拍卖理论、机制设计、公共经济学和实验与行为经济学。她于2011年在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学博士，此前，她分别于2006在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学硕士学位和2005年在北京大学取得理学学士（数学与应用数学）和经济学学士（双学位）学位。她的论文主要发表在Games and Economic Behavior和International Journal of Game Theory等国际期刊。她曾为Review of Economic Studies、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、International Economic Review 和Economic Theory等国际期刊担任过匿名审稿工作。

【摘要】This paper provides a novel micro foundation for the formation and maintenance of political connection, with a simple econometric test to support the theoretical predictions. In a two-stage model, the local bureaucrat sequentially maximizes her payoff by making deals with a local or domestic _rm. The initial deal allows its entry in the first stage while the follow-up deal in the second stage enables an obstacle against the threat of outsiders which can be overcome only for sufficiently competitive outsiders. We show that when the local bureaucrat has concerns about local citizens' well-being because of career considerations, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where only highly competitive local _rms can afford both deals, which results in active connection. Active connection can be observed with positive probability as long as the bureaucrat does not fully represent local citizens' interests. Moreover, the connection is stubborn when the magnitude of the obstacle is large.

供稿:夏寒;编辑:杨菲;核稿:陆美贺