数量经济学研讨会

题 目：Lock-In Through Passive Connections

主讲人：崔志伟副教授

时 间：2020年10月28日下午12:30-13:30

地 点：明德主楼734

摘 要：

We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We study the role of passive connections; these are links that other agents form to a given agent. Such passive connections may create an endogenously arising form of lock-in where agents don’t switch actions and links, as this may result in a loss of payoff received through them. When agents are constrained in the number of links they form, the set of Nash equilibria includes action-heterogenous strategy profiles, where different agents choose different actions. Depending on the precise parameters of the model, risk-dominant, payoff-dominant, or action-heterogenous strategy profiles are stochastically stable.

主讲人简介： 崔志伟博士,北京航空航天大学经济管理学院副教授。他的主要研究方向包括社会网络与经济行为理论、博弈理论及其应用。目前, 他已经在国内外知名经济学期刊上发表论近20篇，并有论文被Journal of Economic Theory 条件接收，以及多篇论文在顶级期刊的修改和评审中。此外，他还主持和参与了多项国家自然科学基金项目。

数量经济教研室

中国人民大学经济学院

2020年10月22日