讲座时间：2025年6月9日10:00-11:30

讲座地点：明德主楼734会议室

主讲人：SHOTA ICHIHASHI

主题：Mechanism Design and Innovation Incentive for an Ad-Funded Platform (with Doh-Shin Jeon and Byung-Cheol Kim)

讲座简介：

We study a mechanism design problem in which a platform allocates multiple pieces of heterogeneous content and advertisements to consumers. The platform faces a trade-off: Allocating more content and ads increases advertising revenue, but it also raises information rents and decreases revenue from selling content. Unlike standard monopoly screening, the platform serves consumers with negative virtual types but tailors the content allocation and advertising policy to limit harm to content sales. The optimal mechanism rationalizes real-world contracts used by ad-funded platforms and shows how the platform’s reliance on advertising affects its incentives to invest in content quality.

个人简介：

Shota obtained his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 2018 and currently works at Queen's University as an assistant professor. He specializes in microeconomic theory, especially in the economics of privacy, data, and AI. His papers have been published in journals such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, RAND Journal of Economics, and Management Science.