[经济学院青年学者论坛​]A Theory of Finite Sequential Search with Applications

题目:A Theory of Finite Sequential Search with Applications
主讲人:Daniel Z. Li, Business School, Durham University.

摘要:We propose a framework for studying sequential search with a finite deadline, where agents search both sequentially and simultaneously.  We show several important applications of this framework.  [1] Sequential Search Auction, where a seller searches for potential buyers by a finite deadline.  We show that the optimal search mechanism is characterized by decreasing reserve prices and increasing search intensities.  The results help explain the pervasiveness of negotiation as a dominant selling-process in many markets.  [2] Optimal Search Intensity, where an agent chooses search intensity adaptively in each period.  We characterize the fallback value and the deadline effect that jointly determine the dynamics of optimal search intensity.  [3] Time Preference.  In our search model, we provide a rational foundation for procrastination and impatience, for which researchers normally resort to behavioral explanations.  [4] R&D Tournament.  Using our framework, we investigate the sequential and adaptive choices of agents’ effort levels in dynamic contests, which greatly extends the current literature that focuses on binary decision rules.

主讲人简介: 李志赟,现任英国杜伦大学商学院经济学助理教授。2007年毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院,获经济学硕士;2012年毕业于牛津大学,获经济学博士。研究方向为应用微观经济学和产业组织,已在B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics、 Economics Letters、Journal of Comparative Economics、《经济研究》、《经济学(季刊)》等国内外刊物上发表论文十余篇。
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