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[组织经济学Seminar​]Aggressive, Stable or Corrupt? Theory and evidence of the Competition Driven Career Path in the Chinese Bureaucracy
发布日期:2018-09-13

组织经济学Seminar
总第99期

【OE201809】

 

组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。

时间:9月17日(周一)中午12:00-13:30
地点:人大明德主楼623教室
主讲:徐晓书(上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授)
主持:李三希(中国人民大学经济学院副教授)
主题:Aggressive, Stable or Corrupt? Theory and evidence of the Competition Driven Career Path in the Chinese Bureaucracy
摘要:This paper provides a theoretical model as well as empirical evidence on Chinese bureaucrats` incentives in the competition driven promotion system. By assuming that the candidate with the best economic performance under stability becomes the winner, and that candidates have different types (including ability and age), we reveal in equilibrium how a candidate`s strategy changes as his age increases. Moreover, we identify three types of interesting incentives in the case of asymmetric competition. We also use the biographic data of prefectural leaders and the corresponding fiscal expenditure structure to show that all theoretical predictions can be supported. This paper provides strong evidence on how mechanism can deeply shape people`s behavior and gives rich implications on the understanding of the Chinese bureaucracy from a novel and micro angle.

主讲者简介:徐晓书,现为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授,研究领域为微观经济理论、产业组织、拍卖理论、机制设计、公共经济学和实验与行为经济学。她于2011年在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学博士,此前,她分别于2006在俄亥俄州立大学取得经济学硕士学位和2005年在北京大学取得理学学士(数学与应用数学)和经济学学士(双学位)学位。她的论文主要发表在Games and Economic Behavior和International Journal of Game Theory等国际期刊。她曾为Review of Economic Studies、Theoretical Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、Economic Theory和Canadian Journal of Economics等国际期刊担任过匿名审稿工作。

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