[产业经济学研讨会]Efficient Liability in Markets for Credence Goods
【时间】2017年12月6日(周三)   12:00-13:30
【主讲】张锦  对外经济贸易大学经济学系副教授
【主题】Efficient Liability in Markets for Credence Goods
【点评】杨继东 中国人民大学经济学院副教授
【摘要】We model an expert`s service as credence goods for which the expert has more information about the consumer`s demand and the treatment outcome can be verified with some probability, and study the role of liability in disciplining the expert`s behavior in such a market. The expert, who can provide two potential treatments for a consumer`s problem, may misbehave in two ways: prescribing the "wrong" treatment given his private information, or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose the problem. We show that under a range of liability rules, the expert will choose the appropriate treatment based on his information if the price margins for the two treatments are close enough. Moreover, there exists a liability rule which can motivate the expert to choose efficiently both the treatment and the diagnosis effort. This efficiency result continues to hold when the expert`s diagnosis effort generates only a noisy signal about the nature of the consumer`s problem, provided the signal is sufficiently informative.
【主讲人介绍】张锦:对外经济贸易大学经济系副教授,在Review of International Economics,International Journal of Industrial Organization,International Journal of Game Theory等国际期刊上发表论文数篇。多次在与博弈论和贸易相关的国际学术会议上宣读论文。主要研究领域为博弈论、国际贸易和产业组织。
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