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[宏观经济学研讨会]Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
发布日期:2017-11-21
【ECON20171219】
宏观经济学研讨会
(总第234期)
 
【时间】2017年11月22日(周三)12:15-13:45
【地点】明商0202教室
【主讲】周璇 中国人民大学经济学院助理教授
【主题】 Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency(F. Bianchi & L. Melosi, FRB of Chicago Working Paper, 2016)
【摘要】We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model in which monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents face uncertainty about the nature of these deviations. When observing a deviation, agents conduct Bayesian learning to infer its likely duration. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur: Agents are confident about a prompt return to the active regime, macroeconomic uncertainty is low, welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, agents’ beliefs start drifting, uncertainty accelerates, and welfare declines. If the duration of the deviations is announced, uncertainty follows a reverse path. For the U.S. transparency lowers uncertainty and increases welfare.
【主持】陈彦斌 教授


    人大宏观经济学研讨会(Macro Workshop)旨在追踪宏观经济学国际最新进展,倡导构建符合国情的动态优化模型,并使用计算机模拟研究经济增长、收入分配和宏观政策等中国宏观经济重大问题。
联系人:刘哲希    Email:Macro_Workshop@163.com
资料下载:www.docin.com/mydoc-88265459-1.html
更多讲座信息请访问:econ.ruc.edu.cn,www.yanjiuyuan.com.cn。
 
 
中国人民大学经济学院
中国经济改革与发展研究院
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