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[劳动经济学研讨会]“I (Eye)`` on You: In-group Favoritism in a Dictator Game
发布日期:2017-10-19
劳动经济学研讨会
(总第46期)




【时间】2017年10月20日(周五)11:40-13:10
【地点】明德主楼734会议室
【主题】“I (Eye)`` on You: In-group Favoritism in a Dictator Game
【主讲】郑金笛 (University of Amsterdam, CREED)

【Abstract】It is a well-established result in the literature that being observed by others already affects pro-social behavior. Less research, however, has shed light on the heterogeneity of such effect. Does it matter whether someone is observed by an in-group member, or by an out-group member? The same question applies to parties who directly benefit from such pro-social behaviors. The answer is important for charitable fundraising strategy, for instance. In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of different identities in a dictator game. We do so by creating in-group and out-group in the laboratory, using a variation of the minimum-group paradigm. Varying the group composition, we conduct a one-shot dictator game with a passive observer. There are four scenarios (treatments) among the dictator, the recipient and the observer: 1) three of them are in-group, 2) the observer is out-group, 3) the recipient is out-group, and 4) the dictator is out-group. The results show that dictators in scenario 4 give less than those in the other three scenarios, whereas there are insignificant differences in the dictators? giving in the other three scenarios. This illustrates that dictators give more to the recipient when at least either recipient or the observer is in-group. When the dictator is matched with an in-group recipient and an in-group observer, however, no additional dictator giving is observed. (joint with Anita Kopányi-Peuker)
 
主讲人简介:郑金笛,荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学博士生(2018年毕业),研究领域为实验经济学、行为经济学、社会身份和应用微观经济学,美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校访问学者。
 
 
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