[产业经济学seminar​]Sequential Search Auction with a Deadline




【主讲】李志赟  Assistant Professor in Economics
                        Durham University Business School
【主题】Sequential Search Auction with a Deadline
【点评】李三希 中国人民大学经济学院副教授
【摘要】Many sale mechanisms involve multiple rounds of transactions with a deadline, such as in takeovers.  In this paper, we investigate such a problem in a sequential auction context.  In our model, specifically, a seller allocates an indivisible product among potential bidders within finite periods, and to invite a bidder, the seller needs to pay a positive cost.  The sequential search mechanism is composed of a sequence of auction reserve prices, and that of bidder samples.

We first show that there exists a symmetric cutoff equilibrium for bidders, and the optimal search procedure can be implemented by a sequence of second price auctions with properly set reserves.  Second, the optimal value cutoffs, as well as optimal reserve prices, are descending overtime, which are related only to the value of the bidders in the immediately following period.  Our formulation generalizes the classic reservation prize in sequential search problems (Weitzman, 1979).  Third, the optimal sampling strategy is characterized by increasing search intensity overtime.  In another word, it is optimal for the seller to invite fewer bidders in the earlier stages, while invite increasingly more bidders when it approaches the deadline. 

We also investigate the efficient search mechanism, and show that the efficient search procedure is featured by lower cutoffs and search intensity, when compared with the corresponding outcomes of the optimal search mechanism.
Employment: Assistant Professor in Economics,Durham University Business School

人大经济论坛 rdjjlt.org 人大经济论坛 bbs.econ.ruc.edu.cn