【时间】 2016 年 12 月 16 日（周五） 12： 00－13： 30
This paper aims to study the strategic role of a welfare-maximizing public firm in a horizontal product differentiation model under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. We find that (i) the mixed homogeneous goods market arises under Bertrand firms when the product differentiation is very costly, but it is impossible under Cournot competition because the private obtains no incentives to produce homogeneous products with the public firm; (ii) when the investment is very effective, the public firm always takes the responsibility to undertake the differentiation investment under both Bertrand and Cournot, while the private firm responds to be a free-rider and enjoys the benefits from resulting product differentiation; (iii) Bertrand firms produce heterogeneous products in a wider range of parameter values compared to Cournot firms. However, when products are differentiated under both modes, Cournot competition leads to a higher degree of product differentiation. We also apply our model into international trade to see the effect of endogenous horizontal product differentiation on trade patterns.
曾辰航，美国密苏里-哥伦比亚大学经济学博士，山东大学助理教授。研究领域为产业组织理论，应用微观经济理论。 已经在Journal of Economics，Economics Letters， Pacific Economic Review 等国际知名期刊上发表多篇论文。
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